The world is looking befuddled with the Trump administration in the United States and its policies. From being looked upon as a messiah of hope for serious attempts at stopping wars in Europe and the Middle East (Russia-Ukraine & Israel-Hamas), to declaring its transactional attitude towards trade, to making noises on annexing Greenland, to taking over the Panama Canal, to vice-president J.D. Vance venting at Europe’s leaders, telling them that the biggest threat to their security was “from within” rather than Russa or China, to high-level sackings of agency heads in the US, to new directions on legislative enforcement to the dismantling of various federal departments, there is no shortage of changes to track. Seen from India’s geo-strategic perspective, a positive has been the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting shortly after Donald Trump took office at the White House, thereby indicating a continuity of the Quad initiative, if not increase in its scope, besides Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s successful visit to the US. The anti-China rhetoric raised during the Trump campaigns may, however, not translate into actions at levels that were expected.For India, it is also important that the US evinces interest in the developments in Bangladesh and Myanmar. With the disturbed conditions that exist in both countries, there are likely to be repercussions that will have an effect on India’s security. Bangladesh, under chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, has not stopped its anti-India tirade and is being increasingly seen as warming up to Islamabad. The recent trip of an ISI delegation to Bangladesh and their visits to areas from where they can potentially engineer trouble for India’s Northeast is troubling. So are the media reports of the ISI’s outreach to the ARSA- the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (a creation of the ISI itself) during this visit. The next arrow in Bangladesh’s quiver would be an increased Chinese naval presence at Chittagong port, given that Bangladesh already has Chinese frigates, submarines and missile boats. This is a fair assumption given the five-day visit undertaken recently by Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser Tauhid Hossain in January 2025 to Beijing, where he met top Chinese officials.The current strife in Myanmar seems endless, which also means the Chinese presence, or interference, in Myanmar will continue. For China, trade and economic ties are secondary to its geopolitical and security interests in Myanmar. China’s main objective in Myanmar is to gain access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and gain control over the dual-use deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s west coast. Since 1985, when plans for the development of China’s Yunnan province were made, gaining access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar has been on Beijing’s radar.It was part of China’s “Two-Ocean Strategy”, which focuses on ensuring access to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific in order to break with what China perceives as the encirclement of its borders.Since the 1990s, there has been speculation about the Chinese presence in Myanmar’s Coco Islands. Images taken in January 2023 show signs of military modernisation, including a longer runway, radar station and hangars. With the Myanmar military suffering successive defeats and with the crucial Rakhine state now almost fallen to the Arakan Army (a Chinese creation of 2009), the pressure on the junta’s generals will be immense. To them, the only saviour is China. The development of Kyaukphu port as a Chinese naval outpost will, therefore, become a reality if the military continues to lose control over Myanmar and is in need of Beijing’s assured support to remain in power.A less spoken of, but equally relevant attempt by China to reach the Indian Ocean is Thailand’s Kra Isthmus Canal. This canal is a proposed waterway that would connect the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea. China will be the major beneficiary if this project fructifies as it would help China overcome the Malacca Dilemma. There are reports to suggest that China has been working overtime, mostly behind the scenes, to get Thailand to start work on the canal which is proposed to slice through the Malay peninsula 800 km south of Bangkok. The canal, when it becomes a reality, would allow ships to bypass the choked Malacca Strait, which is also the world’s busiest trade route. It would shorten the distance by 1,200 km for ships that would pass between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. While traditionally, the United States has been the key arms supplier to Thailand, China has taken over this position since 2016. There were multiple reports in the Chinese media in 2023 that China stands ready to expand military cooperation and maintain regional stability with Thailand. Further, in 2024, Thailand’s Navy finalised a deal with the Chinese PLA Navy for S26T Yuan-class submarines. The increasing Chinese military footprint in Thailand achieves two aims; one, it displaces the long-held position of the US as the primary military hardware provider, and two, it gives the Chinese yet another foothold in the Indian Ocean.The increasing presence of the Chinese in the regional context is almost tantamount to their acquiring a “west coast” on the Indian Ocean at the three locations mentioned above, besides their presence at Djibouti, Gwadar and Hambanota. In its initial days, while there has been very less sounds being made on the Chinese military intent in the Indo-Pacific by the Trump administration, it would be fair to assume that the Quad meet immediately after Mr Trump taking over signals the fact that issues like these are on the table; for India, it is necessary to raise it repeatedly to ensure a collective and coordinated response.
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