Assuming command of the second largest and unquestionably the finest Army in the world would be the rarest of rare honour for any professional soldier. In a world at war with itself, and India too facing diverse security challenges to its progress and peace, this hallowed command brings with itself traditional and many unknown emerging problems, which may arise, to encounter and overcome. Thus India’s 30th Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Upendra Dwivedi, who took charge on June 30, will have, in all likelihood, an eventful and exacting tenure ahead. That he carries with it the best wishes of his countrymen and the support of the government and the other services is a foregone conclusion. His first week in command has already witnessed recurring terrorist acts in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistani-origin terrorists. Though each COAS formalises his professional agenda according to his strategic perception and priorities, similar challenges persisting for years and decades are common problems for successive commanders. Among the many enduring confrontations, dealing with a continually assertive and overly ambitious China will remain India’s most critical challenge. The COAS, having been the Northern Army commander earlier, would thus have full and intimate knowledge of China’s provocative proclivities towards us. His directions to all formation commanders confronting the Chinese in the western, central and eastern sectors along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and Indian troops displaying their usual grit wherever the Chinese indulge in mischief, will go a long way in effectively sending the nation’s and Gen. Dwivedi’s message across to the Chinese. The COAS may consider the planning and execution, if necessary, of mirroring actions by us to counter the Chinese mischief. The Army Chief, by virtue of having been the vice-chief in his last appointment, would be more than conversant with the nuances of the Integrated Theatre Commands, whose establishment has been dodging the armed forces despite the government having given the green signal. In concert with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the other two chiefs, Gen. Dwivedi must push the creation of these commands even if it is done with deliberation and without haste. It’s time our top hierarchy in the armed forces employ their collective wisdom to get on with this much-needed transformation. Another area of collective study and analyses are the lessons emerging from the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas conflict. The COAS, and especially his Army Training Command along with the two other services, must delve deep into the nuances of such wars albeit in the sub-continental context. These two ongoing conflicts have given a new and an unexpected orientation to the pursuit of conflicts in today’s age, which appears radically different than the wars fought before these conflicts began. Similarly, the unorthodox but intensive employment of the once-humble drones, now emerging as major force multipliers, must be studied in the India-China and India-Pakistan scenarios. The already promulgated “Agnipath” concept, giving birth to “Agniveers” has already, once again, become the subject of heated discussions, albeit more on political grounds. Along with the other services, the COAS must revisit the “Agniveer” concept and advise the government to tweak this scheme vastly or scrap it. But the services must not let the bureaucracy overrule the services’ requirement of ensuring combat effectiveness being the first principle for Agniveers or any other form of military recruitment. If the government is looking for pruning the burgeoning pension bill of the three services, there are other more effective ways of doing so. In the defence ministry, for example, there are some offices which can be removed as their contribution to the overall security effectiveness of the nation is long over. The COAS will have to look into the rightful issue of finding more money (capital expenditure) within the Army to muster enough resources for modernisation. Meanwhile, as the Army’s operational commitments along the India-China and India-Pakistan borders continues to grow, it must be emphasized to the Centre that instead of raising additional units in the paramilitary forces, the same can be done in the Army for when the balloon goes up, the first responders to battle the enemy and the last bastion of the nation is the Indian Army. Though it was felt that in the last two years terrorism had been largely reduced in J&K, since Narendra Modi government 3.0 was sworn in, Pakistan has upped the ante by resorting to terrorism acts in the region south of the Pir Panjal and in the last week in the hitherto untouched Kathua region. The Army Chief will have to now revisit our entire counter-terrorism strategy, reinforce our counter-terrorism grid and at the local levels, unit and formation commanders will have to become far more intelligence-savvy and tactically more alert and aggressive. It is certain that at this juncture, the COAS and the top security hierarchy of the nation will be contemplating even some strategic counter-measures to effectively thwart Pakistan from further mischief. Pakistan has to be firmly told that India has not yet exploited the many fault lines existing within Pakistan and they had better curb their terrorist tendencies before they are made to face India’s wrath. Modernisation of equipment and platforms, acquisition of tomorrow’s technology, adaptation to newer forms of warfare and enhancing the Army’s combat capabilities will also be of major concern for the new COAS. Importantly, ensuring synergy and better inter-operability among the three services will equally be his KRA. His leadership of the most disciplined and professional fighting force in the world will be critical for the peace and stability of the region and the government must provide it the necessary wherewithal for it to excel in all domains of warfare.
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